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5Abstract: The liberation of France in 
1944 came at a high cost to the local 
populations who were caught up in 
the struggle for their freedom. The 
Allies’ decision to use heavy bombers 
in support of land operations was 
made out of military necessity but 
it had the terrible consequence of 
killing and wounding large numbers 
of French civilians. To deal with the 
dislocation of war all large Allied 
army formations possessed Civil 
Affairs detachments which sought 
to allieviate the impact of battle on 
the civilian populations by helping 
to provide the basic necessities 
of life including clean water, food, 
shelter as well as providing security 
and governance where needed. 
In the towns of Caen, Le Havre, 
Boulogne and Calais, as well as others 
liberated by First Canadian Army and 
its subordinate formations, the Civil 
Affairs detachments were largely 
dealing with the aftermath of the 
bombing by Allied aircraft.
Books and articles about D-Day and the Battle of Normandy continue 
to appear in an unending stream but 
a number of important issues remain 
to be fully explored. This essay 
examines the role of First Canadian 
Army and its subordinate formations 
in two areas that have received little 
attention: decisions with regard to 
the use of heavy bombers in support 
of land operations and aid to the 
civilian population administered by 
Civil Affairs (CA) officers. The two 
issues are intimately linked because 
the major challenges facing the CA 
organization were products of the 
destruction of French towns by the 
heavy bombers of the RAF/RCAF 
and the US Army Air Forces. The first 
part of the paper will show that the 
Canadian government – by its own 
choice – had no say in Allied strategic 
planning in general, and bombing 
policy in particular. Thus it fell to 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, 
commander of the First Canadian 
Army in Northwest Europe, to 
apply Allied bombing capacity in 
support of his forces, the subject of 
the following part of the paper. The 
remainder of the piece relates how 
the Civil Affairs organization of First 
Canadian Army organized relief for 
civilian populations in areas targeted 
by the heavy bombers. 
Throughout the Second World 
War the government of Canada 
systematically avoided any attempt 
to become involved in the strategic 
direction of the war. Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King and his principal 
a d v i s o r ,  O . D .  S k e l t o n ,  w e r e 
determined to maintain Canadian 
independence by rejecting any 
suggestion that they should follow 
Robert Borden’s example of seeking a 
voice in Commonwealth foreign and 
defence policy. The consequences 
of this policy were outlined in a 
memorandum written by Lester B. 
Pearson, then the Official Secretary 
in the Office of the Canadian High 
Commission in London, who noted 
that, “so far as policy and planning 
in this war are concerned, our status 
is little better than that of a colony.” 
Our role, he concluded, was to supply 
soldiers and pilots who will be told 
where and when to fight “as a result 
of deliberations in which we have had 
no part…I dislike this role of unpaid 
Hessians.”1
Pearson’s memo and similar 
protests from other diplomats were 
ignored in Ottawa where the Prime 
Minister rejected all attempts to 
re-create the Imperial War Cabinet 
instituted by Lloyd George in 1917. 
For King such proposals meant 
“responsibility without power” and 
he preferred a policy that avoided 
both.2 It was therefore not surprising 
that Canada was neither informed 
nor consulted on the terms of the 
Atlantic Charter in 1941 and was 
invited to participate in photo ops – 
not discussions – at the two Quebec 
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Opposite: A bulldozer clears rubble from 
the streets of Caen on 10 July 1944 
shortly after the liberation of the city. 
Most of the civilian casualties as well 
as the damage was caused by Allied 
bombers.
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6Conferences. One result was to place 
the burden of upholding the status of 
the Canadian military as the national 
service of a sovereign state and not 
just subordinate components of 
Allied formations under British and 
American command.
As preparations for the invasion 
of France, Operation “Overlord,” 
were finalized, Canadian land, air, 
and naval forces were integrated 
into British command structures. 
Both the Royal Canadian Navy 
and the Royal Canadian Air Force 
would continue to serve in this 
manner but the decision to form First 
Canadian Army in 1943 reinforced 
the Canadian government’s policy 
of requiring the Canadian Army 
commander to formally certify that 
“Overlord” and all subsequent plans 
were “feasible operations of war.”3 
Even if the government had no desire 
to be committed by participation 
in Allied military planning it had 
a fundamental responsibility to 
ensure that large bodies of Canadian 
citizen soldiers were not sacrificed, 
unwittingly or not, in unduly risky 
operations of which Canadian 
authorities had less than complete 
knowledge. 
The existence of First Canadian 
Army in the Allied order of battle 
raised other questions which many 
wished to avoid. An army-sized 
formation is made up of two or 
more corps which in turn normally 
consists of two or more divisions. 
Large numbers of ancillary troops are 
attached at both the corps and army 
level along with medium artillery 
regiments, engineers, and much else 
including Civil Aid detachments. 
Under ordinary circumstances an 
Army has considerable latitude 
to plan and carry out operations 
under a directive from the Army 
Group commander. After General 
Bernard Law Montgomery was 
appointed to command the Anglo-
Canadian 21st Army Group neither 
Lieutenant-General  S ir  Miles 
Dempsey (Second British Army) nor 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar 
(First Canadian Army) were allowed 
much room for independent action. 
Montgomery controlled as many 
aspects of operations as he could by 
bypassing both Army headquarters to 
deal directly with Corps commanders 
when it suited him.4
Montgomery had other reasons 
for wishing to limit the independence 
of First Canadian Army. He had little 
confidence in Crerar and would have 
preferred to deal with Lieutenant-
General Guy Simonds, whom he 
regarded as the only competent 
senior Canadian officer and, equally 
important, the only one who would 
not play the Canadian card if a 
dispute arose. Crerar, he correctly 
feared, would wish to be seen as 
the leader of Canada’s national 
army, an aspiration complicated 
by the fact that only one of the two 
Corps in his Army was Canadian. 
Montgomery repeatedly postponed 
activating First Canadian Army 
Headquarters and initially sought 
to limit Crerar’s responsibilities. The 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 
General Sir Alan Brooke, understood 
Montgomery’s views but he noted:
I want you to make the best possible 
use of Crerar, he must be retained in 
Command of the Canadian Army…
You can keep his Army small and 
give him the less important role, 
and you will have to teach him. 
We had the same trouble in the last 
war and had to replace Byng by 
Currie although the latter was a very 
medium commander.5
Brooke’s comment about Byng 
and Currie is both inaccurate and 
typical of the condescending attitude 
of senior British officers. Crerar 
would have to learn to deal with 
this as best he could. While waiting 
for Montgomery to activate First 
Canadian Army, a small headquarters 
was established and the Civil Affairs 
sections of both 2nd Canadian Corps 
and First Canadian Army began 
their work. Every Army and Corps 
in the Allied sector was mandated to 
assume responsibility for refugees, 
relief supplies, medical assistance, 
and other functions during periods of 
active operations in their formation’s 
sector.6
I d e a l l y ,  c o - o p e r a t i v e 
arrangements with local authorities 
on these and other key questions 
Prime Minister Mackenzie King (left) and his principal advisor, O.D. Skelton (right), 
were determined to maintain Canadian independence by rejecting any voice in 
Commonwealth foreign and defence policy. The two men, along with King’s sister, Jennie 
Lay, visit Kingsmere, King’s summer home in the Gatineau Hills of Quebec, in July 1923.
Li
br
ar
y 
an
d 
Ar
ch
iv
es
 C
an
ad
a 
C-
02
60
31
3
and : Heavy Bombers and Civil Affairs First Canadian Army in France, July-September 1944
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
7such as currency and public finance 
should have been in place, but 
American hostility towards French 
leader Charles de Gaulle meant 
that no agreement existed when the 
Allies landed in France. Fortunately, 
de Gaulle took matters into his 
own hands, reaching Normandy 
on 14 June and claiming authority 
for his National Committee of 
Liberation. He appointed a close 
associate, François Coulet, as Civil 
Commissioner and Colonel P. de 
Chevigne as Military Commander for 
Normandy. Although full recognition 
of de Gaulle and his provisional 
government was postponed until 
October 1944, British and Canadian 
Civil Affairs officers worked with 
Coulet and his nominees without 
difficulty.7
Montgomery activated 2nd 
Canadian Corps on 11 July after 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division arrived 
in France. The Corps remained under 
British command as part of 2nd Army 
until the end of July, taking over the 
city of Caen and responsibility for 
civil affairs in a city devastated by 
Allied bombing. The issue of civilian 
casualties from air raids on France 
has attracted considerable attention 
from historians in recent years. The 
publication of Eddy Florentin’s 1997 
book, Quand les alliés bombardaient la 
France 1940-1945 with its estimate of 
60,000 French fatalities from bombing 
has led researchers to review the 
debate over Allied bombing policy 
and to produce important case 
studies.8
In 1944, attacks on the French rail 
system as part of the “Transportation 
Plan” inflicted considerable collateral 
damage to town and cities and their 
French inhabitants. At the time, the 
policy was explained in terms of 
preventing German reinforcements 
and supplies from reaching the 
battle area. Churchill’s protests led 
to a decision to abort the operation 
Allied bombers reguarly attacked transportation targets in French towns and cities in the days and weeks before D-Day as a way 
of preventing the movement of German supplies and reinforcements to the front. This photo of Argentan shows how the railway 
marshalling yard and engine sheds have been effectively destroyed by aerial bombing, but there has also been significant damage 
to the residential areas of the the town.
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8if civilian deaths exceeded 10,000. 
No such reservations were in place 
for raids in direct support of the 
D-Day landings and the destruction 
of towns like Lisieux and St. Lô 
on the eve of the invasion was 
accepted as an operational necessity.9 
Caen had also been bombed on 
D-Day and afterwards, but these 
events were soon overshadowed 
by the decision to use the heavy 
bombers to support the land battle 
and break the stalemate in front of 
Caen. Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris 
accepted Montgomery’s request 
to employ Bomber Command in 
Operation Charnwood, the assault 
on Caen, 8 July 1944, but on his 
own terms. For Charnwood Harris 
insisted on a “bomb line” 6,000 
yards from the nearest Allied troops 
and selected four map squares (four 
square kilometers) in the northeast 
section of Caen, well beyond the 
ring of fortified villages the British 
and Canadian troops would have 
to overcome. The bombing added 
exceptionally to the destruction that 
rendered 80 percent of the city’s 
housing inhabitable and killed more 
than 2,000 civilians.10 The soldiers 
waiting to begin their advance were 
greatly impressed with this display 
of raw power but none of the enemy 
defensive positions were struck. 
F.S.V. Donnison, the official 
British historian for civil affairs and 
military government, described the 
fall of Caen on 9 July 1944, “as the 
most formidable civil affairs task 
yet encountered,”11 emphasized by 
the arrival in town of the first CA 
detachment in the early afternoon 
of 9 July.  The massive Allied 
bombardment of Caen presented 
CA with many challenges. The 
immediate need to evacuate 9,700 
people, including upwards of 800 
wounded, proved to be a daunting 
task, further complicated by the 
irony, presumably not lost on the 
population of Caen, that the same 
forces which had brought down 
such destruction on their town 
were now sending in CA teams to 
prevent unrest. The official history 
describes the Senior Civil Affairs 
Officer (SCAO) in Caen, Colonel 
Charles Milne Usher, attached to 
a detachment under the command 
of Second British Army, as being 
consumed by guilt and running “here 
there and everywhere in his kilt” to 
calm the population.12 The 52-year-
old former captain of the Scottish 
rugby side, taken prisoner at the 
Battle of Mons during the Great War, 
educated at Royal Military College 
(Sandhurst), and fluent in French, 
was not an atypical CA officer.13
The immediate needs in Caen 
were dealt with by the formation 
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Left: St. Lô was heavily 
t a r g e t e d  b y  A l l i e d 
bombers in June 1944 
in an effort to interdict 
G e r m a n  m o v e m e n t s 
towards the battle area. 
However, it is clear from 
this air photo of a raid in 
progress that along with 
bridges, roads, railways 
and other transportation 
t a r g e t s ,  s i g n i f i c a n t 
residential areas of the 
town were also hit.
Opposite:  This photo 
shows the destruction 
of St. Lô following its 
liberation by US Forces in 
late July 1944.
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9of joint CA and French committees, 
which also worked together to plan 
for rehabilitation. Although there 
was considerable concern about the 
overzealous behaviour of the French 
Forces of the Interior (FFI), it was 
widely recognized that French liaison 
officers, under the direct control of 
the French civil authority, provided 
reliable mediators between local 
officials and army CA. Although 
unexpected, rapid intervention by 
the local authorities to advance 
the welfare of French citizens set a 
precedent for CA in France for the 
remainder of the war. 
Reports from Civil Affairs officers 
provided a detailed description of the 
“agony of Caen” which ascertained 
that:
…most of the streets were so badly 
cratered or blocked with debris 
that they were impassable; that 
shortage of water was acute and 
that it was suspected that available 
supplies were contaminated; that 
the sewage disposal system had 
failed; that there was neither 
electricity or gas; that of a normal 
population of 65,000 the estimated 
number remaining was between 
20,000 and 25,000, of whom 13,000 
homeless were concentrated in 
three public buildings, the Lycée 
Malherbe, the Eglise St. Etienne 
and the Hospice du Bon Sauveur…
One prison was destroyed and the 
prison staff had disappeared; the 
other prison was badly damaged; 
the courts were partially destroyed; 
the fire and civil defence services 
were without water and lacked 
fire-fighting equipment…
Words fail to describe the anguish 
of Caen. It had indeed paid a 
fearful price for its liberation. 
However, the civilian morale 
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French rescue workers removing bodies 
from destroyed buildings following an air 
raid, Caen, 10 July 1944.
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was high even through most 
inhabitants could not understand 
the reason for the severe Allied 
bombardment of the city. A 
skeleton civilian administration 
was available. The refugees were 
well organized and well cared 
for. Arrangements for the care 
of civilian casualties were good 
despite the customary shortage 
of medical supplies. Health was 
extremely good; 20 cases of typhoid 
and four cases of diphtheria were 
the only known cases of epidemic 
disease. Although bread was 
in short supply and there were 
certain other deficiencies, food 
was adequate.
By the evening of the 10th, Civil 
Affairs rations for 20,000 persons, 
supplies of soap, anti-louse 
powder, creosote and chloride 
of lime had reached the town. 
Water points had been provided 
for both military and civilian use. 
Civil labour had been directed to 
assist the bulldozers in clearing 
the principal streets so as to 
permit military traffic. It had been 
ascertained that damage to water 
mains was not severe and that 
if enough pumps were obtained 
from the military sources the 
water supply could be restored. 
Arrangements were made to 
supply these pumps.14
This was the situation facing the 
Civil Affairs officers of 2nd Canadian 
Corps on 11 July when the city 
came under Canadian control. With 
the Orne River in the centre of the 
urbanized area as the front line, 
the most pressing tasks were to 
bury the dead, clear roads, and 
remove refugees who now suffered 
additional collateral damage from 
German artillery fire. “Within a 
week over 9,700 refugees had been 
evacuated including 800 wounded 
and many hundreds sick and infirm 
people.”15 Joint French and Canadian 
committees were established to 
oversee this and other urgent matters. 
The Canadian Civil Affairs experience 
in Caen established a template for co-
operation with French authorities 
which proved invaluable throughout 
the summer. When the Canadians 
advanced towards Falaise in August, 
the refugee problem continued to 
challenge CA officers as thousands 
of civilians had fled south seeking 
refuge in what was to become the 
battle zone between Caen and Falaise.
First Canadian Army was finally 
made operational on 23 July. Brigadier 
W.B. Wedd, the Senior Civil Affairs 
Officer at Crerar’s headquarters, 
worked easily with his French 
counterpart Lieutenant-Colonel 
P.H. Pierrené, delegating authority 
to “spearhead detachments” and 
establishing a special  sect ion 
for refugees.16 Canadian Army 
Headquarters played no part in 
the decisions to bomb Caen or its 
industrial suburbs, but Crerar and 
his senior advisors were determined 
to use the “heavies” to break the 
German defences south of the city. 
Operation Totalize began on the 
night of 7 August when 641 bombers 
targeted villages that were part of 
an interlocking defensive position 
manned by soldiers of two German 
divisions. Almost all civilians had 
been evacuated by the Germans and 
most of the bombs fell in open fields, 
but the bombing was seen as an 
important contribution to the success 
of the first phase of Totalize so the 
plan to employ the Eighth Air Force 
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This air photo taken on 13 June 1944 
shows that the centre of Caen has 
been largely destroyed by Allied bomber 
attacks prior to the heavy attacks carried 
out as part of Operation Charnwood on 
the night of 8 July 1944.
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against a second line of defences went 
ahead. All but 24 of the 292 American 
aircraft bombed accurately but short 
bombing killed 65 Canadian and 
Polish soldiers while injuring 250 
more.17
Despite this, Crerar insisted on 
a further bombing effort in support 
of Tractable, the second attempt to 
reach Falaise. This time 77 of the 811 
bombers, including aircraft from 
RCAF squadrons, misidentified 
their targets and wrecked havoc 
among troops in the rear areas. More 
than 150 Allied soldiers were killed 
and 241 wounded in four separate 
incidents.18 This second tragic event 
might have put an end to the use 
of heavy bombers on the battlefield 
were it not for the intervention of 
General Crerar. Immediately after 
“Tractable” he wrote to Air Marshal 
Harris thanking him for his willing 
co-operation stating that he remained 
“a very strong advocate of the rise of 
heavy bombers in closely integrated 
support of the army.”19 Harris, who 
clearly would have preferred to end 
such operations, was persuaded to 
continue supporting First Canadian 
Army. 
Civil Affairs officers dealt with 
the aftermath of the August battles 
that resulted in “a great deal of 
damage to civilian property.”20 The 
population had largely been evicted 
by the Germans and had found 
shelter in mines, quarries, and open 
fields. As the spearhead detachments 
advanced behind the frontline:
…French Liaison officers proved of 
the greatest value. Between Caen and 
Falaise, many villages were razed to 
the ground and farm buildings…
were in ruins. Livestock were left 
unattended and rounding them up 
placed an additional burden on the 
spearhead detachments who, in the 
depopulated areas, were sometimes 
forced to do the work themselves. 
Carcasses of horses and cattle littered 
the fields and roadsides…Falaise fell 
on 17 Aug. It was a smoking shell of 
a town.21 
T h e  r e f u g e e  d e t a c h m e n t s 
assigned to 2nd Canadian Corps 
was responsible for the initial care 
of the displaced, providing food, 
water, and medical assistance. As 
the army advanced towards the 
Seine River, “Friends Ambulance 
units, French enlisted personnel 
and members of the Corps Feminin 
(Volontaires Françaises)” took over 
responsibility.22
C r e r a r ’ s  h e a d q u a r t e r s 
was directly responsible for the 
operational decisions to employ 
heavy bombers on the battlefield and 
for Civil Affairs in the Caen-Falaise 
plain. On the Army’s left flank a 
very different situation developed. 
Lieutenant-General Sir John Crocker 
and his staff officers at 1st British 
Corps headquarters resented their 
subordination to Crerar and their 
exclusion from a major operational 
role.23 Crocker, an experienced 
professional, had commanded his 
corps in the D-Day landings and 
planned Charnwood, the battle for 
Caen, but after 9 July the corps’ 
Two French women walk through the ruined streets of Falaise, 17 August 1944.
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task was simply to protect the left 
flank and conform to the Canadian 
advance.
There was no reason to employ air 
power in support of such operations 
and most of the towns between 
the Dives and Seine Rivers were 
liberated without major destruction 
or civilian losses. The corps’ Civil 
Affairs detachment did not have 
to deal with the aftermath of the 
bombing of Caen and this may have 
contributed to their approach to 
planning Operation Astonia, the 
battle for Le Havre. Montgomery’s 
directive of 20 August emphasized 
the need “to secure the port of 
Havre very early” as the harbour 
and railways “will be required for 
the maintenance of the armies.” 
Crocker, according to his biographer, 
welcomed Operation Astonia, “as the 
sort of semi-independent operation” 
that allowed him to be free of Canadian 
Army control.24 His staff drew upon 
intelligence from the Army Air Photo 
Interpretation Section but Crerar 
was content to send his senior staff 
officer, Brigadier Churchill Mann, 
to the planning conference. Mann 
took notes but did not intervene. 
Crocker was also authorized to 
communicate directly with 84 Group, 
2nd Tactical Air Force, and RAF 
Bomber Command - normally Army-
level responsibilities.25
Operation Astonia has become 
the most controversial battle fought 
by 21 Army Group in France 
because Crocker’s plans included 
the employment of heavy bombers 
without any apparent concern for 
civilian casualties. The most recent 
study of the tragedy notes that “Le 
Havre took a greater tonnage of 
bombs in September 1944 (though 
with fewer incendiaries)  than 
Hamburg in July 1943…the human 
toll of the September bombings 
was 1536 dead and 517 missing…
Le Havre ended the war ranked as 
France’s most damaged city, with an 
estimated 82% rate of destruction.”26
No good explanation has been 
offered for the decision to target 
sections of the old city which were 
not related to the coastal gun 
batteries or the forward defences 
but Crocker may have hoped to shock 
the German garrison into surrender 
by a demonstration of raw power. 
Arrangements to target the city on 
5 September included a follow-up 
leaflet raid urging German troops to 
surrender. Crocker did meet with the 
German garrison commander before 
the bombing to explain the scale 
of the Allied attack. The battleship 
Warspite, RAF bombers, and two 
Will Ogilvie – Convoy in Caen.
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full divisions supported by two 
armoured brigades, the specialized 
armour of 79th Armoured Division 
and the “Kangaroos” of 1st Canadian 
Armoured Personnel regiment were 
preparing an assault.27 Colonel 
Eberhard Wildermath refused to 
surrender or to evacuate civilians 
and on the afternoon of 5 September, 
348 aircraft attacked the city with 
1,880 tons of bombs. A second attack 
on the night of 6-7 September and 
a third on 8 September brought the 
total to 4,000 tons dropped on the 
city before the ground attack with 
heavy bomber support on the outer 
defences began. 28
Enemy resistance ended in less 
than 48 hours with mass surrender 
of more than 11,000 German troops. 
Crocker offered his thanks to Air 
Marshal Harris in a note praising 
“the absolute accuracy of bombing 
and timing on every occasion”29 
and General Crerar, anxious to 
have Harris’ support in the capture 
of Boulogne and Calais, sent a 
congratulatory message to him a few 
days later. These messages led Harris, 
or his public affairs officers, to send 
Flight Lieutenant R.F. Delderfield 
to write a story on this successful 
example of close support of army 
operations.
Delderfield, who would become 
one of Britain’s leading postwar 
novelists, was shocked by what 
he found. The Civil Affairs officer 
Delderfield consulted “stated bluntly 
that…an entire residential area of the 
town had been razed to the ground” 
in the raid of 5 September and 
“other residential areas were hit on 
successive days.”30 Delderfield later 
met with French civilian officials 
and British army officers, the latter 
praising the accuracy and effect 
of the bombing that proceeded 
the actual attack. He returned to 
Bomber Command and produced an 
article on “the effect of our bombers 
on the outskirts and docks” plus 
a confidential report which was 
restricted to senior officers of Bomber 
Command.31 Delderfield’s report, 
which influenced Harris to oppose 
a similar attack on Flushing in 
October and to resist further efforts 
to employ his bombers against targets 
in occupied Europe, was not a factor 
in the very different plans developed 
for Operation “Wellhit,” the attack 
on Boulogne. 
While 1st British Corps was 
preparing for the assault on Le Havre, 
2nd Canadian Corps’ armoured 
divisions raced north into Belgium. 
The corps’  infantry divisions, 
however, were assigned the much 
less glamorous task of clearing the 
enemy from the Channel Ports: 
Boulogne, Calais and Dunkirk. The 
3rd Canadian Infantry Division 
reached the outskirts of Boulogne 
and Calais on 5 September and 
2nd Division left Dieppe, liberated 
without bombing or a battle, for 
Dunkirk the same day.
The Channel Ports were heavily 
fortified for all around defence 
presenting a formidable challenge, 
but the newly promoted Field 
Marshal Bernard Montgomery was 
impatient. His conflict with Supreme 
Commander General Eisenhower 
over the “single thrust” versus 
“broad front” strategy had not yet 
been resolved and he told General 
Crerar that with “one good Pas de 
Calais port,” additional transport and 
an increased airlift he could sustain 
the advance to the Ruhr that he 
hoped to accomplish using the Allied 
Airborne Army in what became 
Operation “Market Garden.”32 Crerar 
told Montgomery that the Canadians 
were going “to button things up 
properly, taking a little more time 
if necessary, in order to assure a 
decisive assault.”33 Canadian caution 
was influenced by the fact that Major-
General Dan Spry’s 3rd Canadian 
Infantry Division was to attack 
Boulogne with two infantry brigades, 
not the two divisions that were used 
An RAF Halifax bombs Le Havre on 10 
September 1944.
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at Le Havre. Spry’s other brigade was 
probing the Calais defences.
Civi l  Affairs  planning for 
operations in Boulogne began in 
earnest on 7 September, when the CA 
staff at 2nd Canadian Corps moved 
to the town of Colembert about 
16 kilometres east of Boulogne. A 
detachment organized specifically to 
deal with refugees, and augmented 
by Volontaires Francaise, moved 
into the vicinity.34 Working closely 
with Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Coté, 
3rd Canadian Division’s Assistant 
Adjutant and Quartermaster General 
(AA & QMG), the staff at CA, 2nd 
Canadian Corps developed plans for 
both Boulogne and Calais. Lieutenant-
Colonel Coté was born in Edmonton 
in 1903. He was educated at College 
St. François Xavier and the University 
of Alberta. Bilingual but very much 
a Franco-Albertan, Coté worked for 
the French language service of Radio 
Canada until 1939 when he joined the 
Royal 22e Régiment. Appointed AA & 
QMG 3rd Canadian Division in early 
1943 he was involved in planning the 
administrative and logistical aspects 
of the division’s role in Operation 
“Overlord.” After the war Coté 
served in a number of diplomatic 
posts including Ambassador to 
Finland.35
Of immediate concern to Coté 
and the CA officers were fears of a 
security leak which precipitated the 
evacuation of a ring of villages around 
Boulogne. As a result, CA staff and 
members of the 219 CA Refugee (R) 
detachment, working in conjunction 
with the mayor of Montreuil-sur-
Mer, his staff and members of the 
Secours National, developed an 
evacuation plan, and presented it 
to 3rd Canadian Division.36 The 
scheme envisioned close cooperation 
between several  French c ivi l 
representatives including the mayors 
of neighbouring municipalities, the 
resources of the Secours National 
and CA. The plan called for the 
direction of the population to 
evacuation zone collection points, 
followed by processing by a CA 
officer, members of the gendarme 
and a representative of the Secours 
Nationale. At that time, the refugees 
became the responsibility of French 
civil authorities. Food would come 
from CA rations and captured 
German foodstuffs. The mayor of 
Montreuil and a CA officer selected 
a number of evacuees to return to 
their respective municipalities to 
act as security guards. At this point, 
the 219 (R) CA detachment received 
instructions that the welfare of 
refugees was the sole responsibility 
of French authorities, but the unit 
should be at the mayor’s disposal 
and meet with civil authorities daily 
to keep abreast of the situation. This 
prompted the CA diarist to claim, “it 
is a first-rate example of the French 
looking after themselves and we 
assisted them.”37
A much more difficult task 
soon confronted CA and the French 
authorit ies  when the German 
garrison commander Lieutenant-
General Ferdinand Heim ordered the 
evacuation of the civilian population. 
More than 8,000 civilians left the city. 
Captain J.S. Martin, 3rd Division’s 
Historical Officer, described the 
stream of refugees:
they glanced at our uniforms and 
murmured “Canadiens.” Moving 
slowly their brightly coloured clothes 
in sharp contrast to their unhappy 
LC
M
SD
S 
Ai
r P
ho
to
 C
ol
le
ct
io
n
11
and : Heavy Bombers and Civil Affairs First Canadian Army in France, July-September 1944
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
15
expressions, these people bore 
enormous burdens… Small dogs, 
some in baskets and some peering 
from brief-cases and others straining 
eagerly at leashes were plentiful. Few 
if any of these people realized that 
food, shelter, and transport is to be 
provided for them…38
Several thousand civilians had 
refused the order to evacuate the 
city. When a French Liaison Officer 
(LO) provided Lieutenant-Colonel 
Coté with information suggesting 
an acute food and medical supply 
shortage, especially for children, Coté 
arranged to have the CA spearhead 
detachment enter Boulogne with the 
lead troops as a way of informing 
civil authorities that food and 
medical support would be available 
to them on the day of liberation.39 
An additional CA detachment was 
to enter Boulogne to look after 
non-welfare work. Coté insisted 
on meeting with the individual CA 
detachments to personally explain the 
division’s expectations, suggesting 
the importance of this exercise from 
both a humanitarian and goodwill 
perspective. Since CA detachments 
travelled with minimum rations and 
not sufficient equipment to cook for 
everyone, suggestions arose that 
branches of the Secours National 
should form teams to cook and serve 
food. The plan called for civilian 
teams, transport and the 219 CA 
(R) detachment to withdraw from 
Boulogne after addressing immediate 
concerns there and go into reserve 
for use in Calais; one CA detachment 
would remain as the only CA presence 
left in Boulogne. By 17 September, 
reports suggested that 3,000 refugees 
from Boulogne were staying in the 
surrounding communes, cared for by 
local authorities, using 9,000 rations 
per week from the army, in addition 
to their own stocks.40
Operation “Wellhit” began 
on 17 September when Bomber 
Command aircraft struck at the 
outer ring of defences. Almost 800 
aircraft obeyed the instructions of 
an RAF group captain “who was in 
radio communication with master 
bomber overhead.”41 While some 
“creepback” inevitably occurred, 
the bombing patterns were tight and 
accurately placed. When prisoners 
were interrogated they reported that 
while little damage to the concrete 
defences was done, morale was 
strongly affected.42 The battle for 
Boulogne lasted for six days and 
considerable damage to the city was 
done by artillery and the tactical air 
force but civilian casualties were 
limited. 
Although the evacuation and 
refugee situation in the Channel Ports 
was by far the largest CA concern, 
CA staff found themselves working 
with French authorities on other non-
refugee matters every day. Much of 
the work took place in the communes 
and towns surrounding Boulogne, 
and in addition to Montreuil, CA 
was active in Samer, St. Omer and 
Desvres. By 12 September, 2nd 
Canadian Corps CA, working 
with their attached French LO, 
Commandant Mengin, established 
civilian medical teams as well as 
police and work teams selected from 
members of the French Forces of the 
Interior (FFI). Meanwhile 150 French 
trucks were awaiting instructions to 
take food into the besieged city. It is 
little wonder the 2nd Canadian Corps 
CA diarist was deeply impressed 
with the French volunteers: “they 
are prepared to look after very large 
numbers and throw themselves 
into the task of organizing their 
reception with enthusiasm and little 
reservation.”43 Displaced persons 
were also an issue. While front line 
troops battled for Boulogne, CA and 
local French authorities spent much 
of the week in which Boulogne was 
being liberated dealing with displaced 
Belgians in Desvres; a colony of 100 
Jews in Samer that had survived a 
concentration camp arrived alongside 
Polish persons seeking to join Polish 
forces. Other Poles remained captive 
in an FFI prison. Canadian CA 
officers specializing in public safety 
and a Canadian officer fluent in 
Polish assigned to the prison for 
vetting purposes had to distinguish 
between Red Poles loyal to the USSR, 
and Blue Poles loyal to the London 
government.44
Once in Boulogne, CA called on 
the FFI to assist in some mopping up 
operations and to act as an auxiliary 
police force. Close cooperation with 
the resistance group proved to be 
“mostly useful to CA and the army,”45 
but working with resistance groups 
and other French civil authorities 
was not without its challenges for 
First Canadian Army. French LOs 
had their hands full in their role as 
intermediaries. Events challenged 
civil-military cooperation, such as 
the discovery of a German weapons 
cache in Boulogne. More than 50 
French Naval firemen with unclear 
credentials announced they were 
in Boulogne to remove all German 
weapons. Coté immediately ordered 
the weapons’ destruction. Questions 
arose about the viability of supplying 
some of the weapons to FFI personnel, 
but that met resistance from some 
French officials. With disagreement 
on all sides, the French LOs tried their 
best to come up with a compromise. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Coté expressed 
dismay that French LOs spent far 
too much time on matters such as 
these which, in his opinion, were 
clearly under divisional control.46 
But, in the spirit of cooperation, staff 
at 2nd Canadian Corps reminded 
Division that the liaison officers 
“rendered excellent service in the 
past, they had a duty to both 21st 
Army Group and their government 
and it was not possible to order 
them not to concern themselves 
with French matters.”47 Nor did 
Commandant Mengin complain 
about working with First Canadian 
Army despite the loss due to theft 
of his car and equipment by two 
Canadian soldiers.48 Instead, Mengin 
went about his business assessing the 
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Above: The original Canadian Army Overseas Photo caption for this image read: “CANADIANS FEED CHILD REFUGEES – These 
hungry children, refugees from Dunkirk, are being fed by Canadians who provided soup, vegetables, bread and meat. Food for these 
youngsters was given top priority when Canadians liberated their city.”
Below: French civilians flee the pending Allied attack on Dunkirk.
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situation in Boulogne, and assigning 
local government officials to their 
new posts in the newly liberated city. 
Mengin then rejoined CA and 3rd 
Canadian Division to plan the Calais 
operation. Only six days earlier, 
Mengin had prevented a FFI group 
in Ardres from attacking a canal 
bridge near Calais held by Germans, 
emphasizing that FFI should only do 
such operations under instruction 
from First Canadian Army. Several 
incidents proved frustrating, but 
failed to quash the cooperative 
nature of civil-military relations. 
However, the First Canadian Army 
war diarist did make note that a 
strong central civil authority was of 
great importance as “over-zealous 
activities of resistance groups in 
France continue.”49
O n  1 2  S e p t e m b e r  t h e 
headquarters of 2nd Canadian 
Corps CA moved to Landrethun-lès-
Ardres, approximately 15 kilometers 
southeast of Calais. Even based from 
this location, Boulogne was still more 
important, but plans for Calais pushed 
forward, using the Boulogne CA plan 
as a model. Lieutenant-Colonel Coté 
insisted on some changes to the 
CA plan. Unhappy with the 219th 
Detachment’s indecisiveness on the 
distribution of foodstuffs, Coté chose 
other CA detachments to take on 
the responsibility for refugees in the 
evacuation of Calais and supervised 
the entire CA operation himself. By 
21 September, the 318 CA detachment 
was at Ardres and had at its disposal 
Commandant Mengin and Voluntaires 
Francaises for the Calais operation. 
T h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  e n e m y 
resistance in Boulogne allowed 
Civil Aid detachments to open 
medical facilities, soup kitchens and 
waterpoints. Within days, many 
refugees returned and the city was 
alive again on the road to recovery. 
British Army engineers of a Port 
Construction and Repair Group 
began work the next day as the 
Canadians left to get ready for 
another siege, Operation Undergo 
– the attack on Calais and Cap Gris 
Nez.50
The  approaches  to  Cala is 
provided a sharp contrast to the 
hills and forests of the Boulanais 
region. The countryside was open 
and flat, crisscrossed with canals and 
drainage ditches. The 36-kilometre 
long Calais-Cap Gris Nez sector 
of the Atlantic Wall contained six 
major fortified zones including new 
concrete defences and strengthened 
Vauban fortresses from previous 
wars. Pressure from Montgomery 
who wanted the Canadians to begin 
operations to clear the approaches to 
Antwerp meant that the troops who 
fought at Boulogne had no time for 
rest. On 25 September, both 7th and 
8th Brigades began to advance as the 
last of the heavy bombers struck the 
outer defences. Reports of the limited 
effect of bombing on the defences 
of Boulogne led to an exceptionally 
large bomber mission with over 900 
aircraft committed to the attack. 
Weather conditions forced two-thirds 
of the crews to abort their attack. 51
Neither bombs nor shells did 
much material damage and the 
battle for Calais required the same 
deliberate infantry-armour tactics 
employed at Boulogne.  Flame 
throwers again proved their worth 
by helping to clear houses, slit-
trenches, and especially pill boxes. 
The first burst of flame invariably led 
to white flags so the key was getting 
the vulnerable weapons into position. 
The civilian population of Calais, 
estimated at 20,000, had according to 
German sources refused to evacuate 
the city in the two weeks before the 
assault began. On the afternoon of 28 
September, word that the “German 
Commander was about ready to 
surrender” reached Civil Affairs 
staff and General Spry agreed to 
suspend operations while a meeting 
was arranged. Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ludwig Schroeder was stalling for 
time but an agreement was reached 
on a 24-hour truce to allow the 
civilians, now anxious to leave, to 
abandon the city. More than 12,000 
refugees fled Calais during the 
truce. Civil Affairs detachments 
working closely with “local and sous-
prefectural authorities”52 managed 
the exodus without serious incident. 
On 30 September, 3rd Canadian 
Division was ordered to move north 
into Belgium to prepare for an assault 
crossing of the Leopold Canal part 
of the battle to clear the approaches 
to Antwerp. The Canadian Civil 
Aid Detachments moved with their 
formations and within 48 hours 
the Canadian role in the liberation 
of France was over. There were no 
ceremonies to mark the moment and 
no subsequent attempts to tell the 
story of their interaction with French 
civilian authority. 
It is difficult to ascertain with any 
authority the failure to tell the story 
of Canadian civil affairs in Northwest 
Europe. Certainly there was a history 
written by Major A.K. Reid, of the 
Historical Section, but it remained 
a Canadian Military HQ report, it 
was not included in C.P. Stacey’s 
official history and was only briefly 
referenced in F.S.V. Donnison’s 
official volume on civil affairs in 
Northwest Europe. Concerns did 
arise that Reid’s narrative, based on 
the experiences of three formations, 
excluded much of the CA work 
done in the European theatre. Major 
A.S. O’Hara, a Canadian civil affairs 
officer, expressed these concerns to 
Reid. “If your history confines itself to 
First Canadian Army, 2nd Canadian 
Corps and 1st British Corps it will be 
rather incomplete.” It would exclude 
“those (officers) attached to 2nd Army 
and 30 Corps. In addition, probably 
all the outstanding rehabilitative 
CA work was done by detachments 
and individuals operating under L 
of C. [Line of Communications]”53 
Also, civil affairs archival documents 
reveal that Major Arthur Reid, based 
at the historical section in London 
after the war, considered himself to 
be an amateur playwright, taken by 
the London theatre scene, possibly 
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at the expense of the Canadian CA 
narrative. Civil Affairs files reveal 
the following quote from Major A.K. 
Reid on 13 November 1945, “This 
job seems to be taking much longer 
than I had anticipated and I do not 
know when I will be finished. I will 
not really mind staying in England 
until next March or so as I have just 
sold the option on a play – written 
in 1938 – which is supposed to be 
coming on at the Criterion Theatre 
about then. And, of course, I want 
to be around when rehearsals start 
so that my immortal script is not 
too mutilated!”54 Major Reid’s last 
correspondence concerning the 
Canadian CA narrative occurred in 
January 1947 where he wrote that he 
was “now a civilian and expect to be 
writing film dialogues for Arthur J. 
Rank.”55
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